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According to the consensus view, it was primarily physical capital accumulation that drove eco-
nomic growth during the early years of state socialism. Growth models incorporating both human 
and physical capital accumulation led to the conclusion that a high physical/human capital ratio 
can cause a lower economic growth in the long run, hence offering an explanation for the failure of 
socialist economies. In this paper, we show theoretically and empirically that according to the logic 
of the socialist planner, it was optimal to achieve a higher physical to human capital ratio in socialist 
countries than in the West. Using a VAR analysis, we fi nd empirical confi rmation that within the 
Material Product System of national accounting, the relative dominance of investment in physical 
capital accumulation relative to human capital was indeed more effi cient than under the system of 
national accounts. 
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1. INTRODUCTION
The economic transition in the countries with centrally planned economies (those 
which identified themselves as socialist and which were often referred to in po-
litical slang as the ‘Eastern Bloc’ or state-socialist) has triggered many studies 
in its underlying sources of growth and ultimate downfall. Many of those make 
use of some sort of growth accounting framework in which they decompose 
GDP growth into the contributions by physical (or fixed) capital, human capital, 
and some sort of residual factor, TFP, which is assumed to capture the effects 
of technological change and even institutional factors. These studies often find 
that technical change was limited (and declining) during the socialist period and 
growth was mainly driven by physical capital accumulation (Kaplan 1968; Berg-
son 1978 [1971]: 166–168; Kontorovich 2001: 687). This view is confirmed by 
Allen (2003) whose simulation exercise indicates that without the massive capital 
accumulation of the 1930s, the USSR would have been worse off in the 1960s 
than it actually was. This follows logically from the neoclassical growth model 
(Solow 1956), which states that an increase in physical capital stock per worker 
increases the steady state level per capita GDP in the long run. 
Yet, when compared to the Western world, actual economic growth in the 
‘Eastern Bloc’ turned out to be much lower. Central and Eastern European coun-
tries (hereinafter referred to as CEE or Eastern Europe) and, to a lesser extent, the 
republics of the USSR, had been much closer to the West in the 1920s in terms of 
per capita income than in the 1980s (Table 1). This is consistent with studies argu-
ing that the lack of technological advance and human capital hampered growth. 
Indeed, it is often found that when physical capital/human capital ratio grows, per 
capita GDP growth decreases (e.g. Erk et al. 1998; Duczynski 2002, 2003).
The overemphasis of physical capital accumulation is rooted in economic 
philosophical differences that also affected statistical standards. Former centrally 
planned countries measured their aggregate economic activity (or aggregate in-
come) in terms of Net Material Product (NMP), loosely described as the sum of 
material production, while the West relied on the United Nation’s System of Na-
tional Accounts (SNA), which also includes immaterial production, mostly in the 
form of services. In addition, material production required more physical capital 
than immaterial production. Hence, in order to achieve a growth in NMP, social-
ist governments were more inclined to maximise material production and hence 
prioritise physical capital accumulation. This view was reflected by the theory of 
socialist reproduction embodied in the growth model voiced by the early Soviet 
economist Grigory Feldman (1964 [1928]): the planning priorities were defined 
in the way that even among material goods, productive capacities were expected 
to grow faster than consumer goods. In the West, on the other hand, where in-
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dividual decisions to maximise utility (usually approximated as a function of 
consumption) aggregate into a behaviour that can be seen as some economy level 
policy, the immaterial sector also took a large share of GDP and, consequently, 
the observed rate of physical capital accumulation was lower. 
This difference in the theory of value and ways of measurement can explain 
why the NBER found that in the 1950s and 1960s, once Western GDP was con-
verted into NMP (i.e. the majority of the service sector value added was subtract-
ed), the West performed poorly in terms of economic development compared to 
the socialist countries. From a socialist planner’s point of view it was thus logical 
to maximise material output and physical capital accumulation. 
In this paper, we analyse economic development in Eastern Europe and the 
former USSR from the above outlined socialist economic policy perspective. In 
Section 2, we start by a basic analysis of the data. We find that most social-
ist countries experienced a sharply rising physical/human capital ratio combined 
with reducing economic growth in terms of GDP per capita. In Section 3, we 
provide some insights into the theoretical background and the practical implica-
tions of the socialist central planning policies. In Section 4, these insights are 
formalised in a one-sector model in which the government can either prefer to 
maximise material output or consumption (or a combination of both). This is an 
exogenous growth model, meaning that the long-run (balanced growth) effect is 
zero. This model is tested in Section 5, where we discuss some effects of physical 
and human capital ratio on growth. We end with a brief conclusion. 
2. DATA
Our empirical analysis uses data on physical1 and human capital as well as GDP 
per capita and its closest Material Product System (MPS) equivalent NMP per 
capita. GDP estimates for Eastern Europe and the former USSR are taken from 
Maddison (2007) as updated on his website (http://www.ggdc.net/MADDISON/
oriindex.htm) and, in the case of the republics of the former USSR, extended 
by Didenko et al. (2013) based on the World Bank (2011).2 The physical capital 
stock data is taken from Van Leeuwen and Földvári (2013) for Eastern Europe 
and Didenko et al. (2013) for the former USSR. The latter estimate is based on 
gross fixed capital to GNP (at factor cost) ratio derived from Easterly – Fischer 
1  This refers to the gross fixed capital stock.
2  Didenko et al. (2013) used GNP/cap, which they assumed comparable to GDP/cap, based on 
Bergson (1961), Becker (1969) and Steinberg (1990). 
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(2001).3 The human capital stock is obtained from Didenko et al. (2013) who 
provide two alternative measures: the cost- and income-based stock of human 
capital.4 The difference between the two human capital measurements is dis-
cussed further below. NMP is taken from Didenko et al. (2013) which, in turn, 
was based on the official figures from 1958 to 1990 and Khanin (1991) for the 
earlier period. The reliability of the primary sources on the former USSR, their 
merits, and shortcomings are discussed by Didenko et al. (2013). The methods of 
construction of the time series for Eastern Europe are discussed by Van Leeuwen 
– Földvári (2013).
The cost-based method is based on Judson (2002), who estimates human capi-
tal by its replacement costs, relying on the public expenditure on education for a 
single year. We introduce only a slight modification: we multiply the replacement 
value of a single year of education by the average years of education in order to 
obtain the replacement costs of the whole educational stock of the average indi-
vidual (Van Leeuwen – Földvári 2008). 
t t jt jt
j
h =S d a
where ht denotes the average human capital stock per worker at the replacement 
cost in year t, St is the average years of formal education in year t, djt is the public 
expenditure on education per level j in year t (per student enrolled), ajt denotes the 
share of the labour force in year t with a certain level of education.
The second method is the income-based measure suggested by Van Leeuwen 
– Földvári (2013). The income-based measure of human capital stock equals the 
present value of all future income flows under some assumptions on the expected 
rate of growth of real incomes, incorporating information on the average age of 
the population. Assuming continuous time and retirement age at 65, the income-
based estimate of human capital can be expressed as:
3  The Soviet Economic Decline Dataset is enclosed to the World Bank electronic publication 
and contains the series with reference to Gomulka – Schaffer (1991) based on ‘Western es-
timates’ on GNP, labour input, and capital stock for the entire Soviet economy: Moorsteen 
– Powell (1966), Powell (1968), CIA (1982), CIA (various years), Kellogg (1989). The data 
from these underlying sources have much in common with those we use for our GNP values 
for the period prior to 1956.
4  For this analysis, the cost-based analysis is the most appropriate. Not only does it compare 
better with the cost-based valuation of fixed capital, but also it remains a yet unanswered ques-
tion of whether we can have income-based capital stock estimates for socialist economies, as 
generally there was just a limited market for fixed capital under socialism while there was a 
quasi-market for human capital. 
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where h  is per worker stock of human capital in monetary units, w  is average 
wage, x is the average age in the population, g is constant rate of expected real 
wage growth and q is the discount factor. We assume that q – p = 0.02, as people 
expect their utility resulting from higher wages will increase with time.
The results are reported in Table 1. 
The most interesting feature is that there seems to be little change in per capita 
GDP ranking over time. Germany, Austria, and Czechoslovakia, together with 
the Baltic States, were as much in the top ranks in 2000 as they had been in 
the 1930s. The same holds true for the physical capital stock, even though the 
countries of the former USSR appeared to have caught up for a short time in the 
1980s. In the income-based human capital stock, we find some sort of reversal 
though: whereas before the World War II it was Czechoslovakia that topped the 
list, their places were taken by Germany and Austria after the war. The Baltic 
States were the most developed among the republics of the USSR both in terms 
of per capita GDP and income-based human capital stock. Unfortunately, we do 
not have comparable cost-based human capital data for Eastern Europe, but the 
limited data that we do have in Table 1 show a similar pattern, with the Central 
Asian republics and Russia dominating before the war, and the Baltic states ap-
pearing at the top of the list thereafter (although they might have been at the top 
of the list in the 1930s, but we unfortunately do not have any data). A possible 
reason may be the USSR central government equalising policy targeted at allow-
ing the low-developed national periphery to catch up with the European Soviet 
regions in terms of education spread, while, at the same time, allowing the more 
developed Baltic republics to sustain their relatively high level. These patterns 
may also be observed for physical capital per capita. As shown in Table 1, even 
though, just as in terms of per capita GDP, Germany and Austria remained the 
leading economies, Russia made up quite some ground in capital formation, espe-
cially up to the 1980s. However, the political collapse in the 1990s hit the former 
Soviet Union area much harder than Eastern Europe and, consequently, the 1930s 
ranking seems to have been restored. 
We report the estimates for the income-based human capital measure in Table 1 
since wage data was available for all countries, while the cost-based estimation 
was only possible for the former USSR. As can be seen from Table 1, in terms 
of human capital endowment, the regional ranking differs from the ranking in 
physical capital. It was especially Czechoslovakia, Austria, and the Central Asian 
republics that did well in the 1930s. This situation remained until the 1980s, with 
the only difference that Germany caught up in the meantime. Yet, the collapse of 
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the socialist regimes completely changed this picture with Germany, Austria and 
the Baltic states at the head of the pack and the Central Asian republics falling far 
behind. This suggests that the human capital stock, when measured by the present 
value of earnings, especially in the Central Asian region, underwent a significant 
devaluation during the transition period. 
In sum, whereas per capita GDP and physical capital rankings were somewhat 
persistent over time, this was less true for human capital. Physical capital ac-
cumulation was especially rapid in the USSR and, to a lesser extent, in Eastern 
Europe, but much of this ambiguous advantage was lost during the transition pe-
riod. Human capital accumulation was especially rapid in Germany and Austria, 
and probably the Baltic states, while the initial lead of the Central Asian republics 
was lost during the 1990s. In other words, it seems as if the massive fixed capital 
accumulation had contributed both to the acceleration of growth initially (at early 
stages of industrialisation) and also to its deceleration at advanced stages of de-
velopment (when human capital intensive service sectors were on the rise) in the 
socialist countries. Hence, whereas initially the gap with the Western countries 
in terms of per capita income seemed to be declining, after the mid-20th cen-
tury, with the increase of human capital intensive economic sectors, it increased 
once more. The observed trends suggest that, in line with the dominant economic 
policy in the ‘Eastern Bloc’, there had been an increased accumulation of physi-
cal capital relative to human capital up to the 1980s, but this gap was narrowed 
somewhat in the 1990s. This feature is plotted in Figure 1. 
Figure 1. Physical to human capital ratio in Eastern Europe, Austria and the former USSR
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We can also observe that Eastern European dynamics were closer to the Aus-
trian than to the Soviet one indicating that countries in Central and Eastern Eu-
rope adopted the Soviet central planning model with some modifications. Also, 
we find a decline of this ratio in the 1990s when market prices for physical capital 
were introduced and thus provided some guidance for its book values. It was logi-
cal that market prices for physical capital collapsed during the transformational 
restructuring of the economy. Another important point to note from Figure 1 is 
that the cost-based human capital indicator seems to move quite well together 
with the income-based measure with the exception of the pre-1940 period. Nev-
ertheless, it is clear that both the cost- and income-based measures show a far 
faster growth in physical/human capital ratio in the USSR than elsewhere. 
3. THE SOCIALIST PLANNER’S PREFERENCES IN THEORY 
AND PRACTICE
We find that while the ranking in terms of GDP per capita did not change much, 
the physical to human capital ratio increased considerably in Eastern Europe and 
even more in the USSR. Even though not unexpected, this observation warrants 
further analysis, given that some growth theories incorporating an endogenous 
investment in both types of capital (Caballe – Santos 1993) predict that a more 
physical capital intensive development path should result in a lower growth rate 
of per capita income. Obviously, from the perspective of a planner in a market 
economy, this direction would be suboptimal. But can the rationality of the eco-
nomic planner in a state-socialist country be squared with the apparent overin-
vestment in physical capital accumulation?5 The most likely explanation lies in 
the different role played by the state in economic development in state-socialist 
countries and market economies, and, as a result, the difference in preferences of 
the social planner. 
The idea to provide some insights into the ‘socialist planner’s preferences’, to 
find some inner rationale, economic behaviour patterns, and to assess efficiency 
of their decisions within the socialist system’s own context can be traced back to 
Bergson (1964). He examines to what extent their behaviour was rational to meet 
their ends while having expected the planners’ welfare function to favour invest-
5  We prefer to call this ‘apparent overinvestment’ since there is no such a thing as optimal in-
vestment in absolute terms, optimality depends on preferences. A capital ratio that classifies 
as overinvestment from a market economy perspective may well be very rational from the 
point of view of a central planner with a classical (pre-marginal revolution) view on value and 
reproduction.
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ment and defence. Indeed, in state-socialism, initially the government takes full 
control of the resources and also makes the majority of allocation decisions. As 
such, we can use the government’s priorities as those of the ‘social planner’.
In a market economy, however, decisions regarding the allocation of resources 
are made by private agents, as they make decisions about the size and allocation 
of their savings and consumption. But the decisive factor is not the role of the 
state: even if the state has a large redistributive power (in a mixed-economy or 
in a welfare state), as long as its primary concern is welfare maximisation in the 
long run (where welfare is modelled as some function of the discounted sum of 
present and future consumption), the final outcome should, at least theoretically, 
not be different than from a society where private agents make all decisions. 
Form a strictly economic point of view, the possible raison d’être for a pre ference 
toward central planning could be the elimination of transaction costs and a re-
duction of informational asymmetry, even though it comes at the price of an ad-
ditional principal-agent problem.6 In the first half of the 20th century, the idea of 
planning seemed quite rational and plausible to many left-wing economic and 
political theorists who contended to gain political power to turn it into reality.
State-socialist governments were led by the Marxian theory of economic de-
velopment and economic reproduction, based on Adam Smith’s view on produc-
tive and unproductive labour. Marxism motivated economic policy in herited this 
distinction between material and immaterial production. The latter was simply 
omitted from the Material Product System (MPS), the system of national account 
widely used in European state-socialist countries until the 1980s and in the Peo-
ple’s Republic of China until 1993.
As the state-socialist systems emerged, it became empirically possible to study 
their strong and weak points. Harrison (1985) notes that two philosophies and 
practices of planning emerged during the late 1920s: (1) the ‘balance school’, 
whose basic idea was not to disrupt social and economic equilibrium, and to 
adapt capital construction to the needs of household consumption and other de-
terminants of social welfare, and (2) the ‘mobilisation school’, which stressed the 
primary role of political decisions to get things done regardless of concomitant 
sacrifices, exertions, and wastes by exercise of authority, i.e. for material produc-
tion. While the immediate winner in the dispute was the ‘mobilisation school’, 
the concepts of the ‘balance school’ were modified and incorporated into the 
official policy rather than rejected. As Gregory (2003) observes, the government 
was interested in positive incentives for the labour force that tended to abstain 
6  In other words, the preferences of the central planner may be different from that of the work-
ers, the declared “owners” of economic resources, and productive capacities in state-socialist 
regimes. 
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from working at their margin if their wage fell below the perceived ‘fair’ level. 
The archives provide numerous expressions of the Soviet leadership’s belief in 
a strong link between consumption and work effort: more Politburo7 time was 
spent on consumption (especially emergency sessions) in the 1930s than on any 
other issue (Gregory 2003: 94). The famine of 1932, for example, forced the au-
thorities to temporarily allocate more resources to consumption at the expense of 
investments. Hence, these two approaches (balance and mobilisation) coexisted 
within the Soviet system as they both agreed on the need for capital accumula-
tion to bring about rapid economic development. After each period of forced 
mobilisation there was need to find a temporary adjustment phase when it was 
possible to voice the need for restored balance as a precondition to any further 
mobilisation.
Even though there is a broad agreement in the literature about the principles 
of the planner, there is disagreement about the practical implication of these 
plans. Ellman (1979) stresses the decisive role of production over distribution, 
exchange, and consumption as the starting point of socialist planning. He also 
reviews how the planners considered material goods as the basis and condition 
of existence, and producer goods had higher priority over consumer goods. This 
was amplified under Stalin’s rule where the balance between current needs and 
investments was strongly biased in favour of the latter based on a general pref-
erence for ‘tomorrow’ over ‘today’ (Nove 1983). The second branch of this lit-
erature agrees about the planner’s preferences but argues that these plans were 
much more poorly implemented. This opinion is headed by Kornai (1992; but see 
also Zaleski 1980; Gregory 2003; Harrison 2005). Kornai sees the central plan-
ning system as some sort of principal-agent problem, where direct bureaucratic 
management is impeded by conflict of interest between the principal (who has 
the authority to command) and agents (who are obliged to execute the orders) 
as well as by information distortions. Hence, Kornai is rather sceptical whether 
the planners’ preferences could have a strong influence on the final output struc-
ture. He argues that priorities often changed over time depending on political 
sentiments. Nevertheless, even with the major and minor management decisions 
that caused deviations from the intended policy, it is still possible to identify 
some fundamental policy objectives in the actual outcomes. Kornai also does 
not distinguish between core preferences that were shared implicitly by most of 
experts and decision-makers (e.g. ‘current consumption is the residual of invest-
ment needs’), and particular preferences that could be campaigned but might be 
7  The highest political organ of the ruling Communist Party in the 1930s comprised of about 
10 persons that defined the political guidelines.
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subject to change (e.g., whether to rely on domestic or imported technical equip-
ment to modernise industry). 
Even though the plans were definitely inefficient in achieving their goals, the 
core principles behind them remained basically unchanged over time. The plan-
ning system survived for more than half a century. There were a number of priori-
ties that were established under Stalin but had survived until the 1980s, remaining 
remarkably constant over time and space: investment over consumption (refer-
ring to investment-maximising mathematical growth model formulated in the late 
1920s by the above-mentioned economist, G. Feldman); industry over agriculture, 
while services were the least important and could be neglected; heavy industry 
(producer goods) over light industry (consumer goods); defence production over 
civilian production; domestic production over imports. Nove (1977, 1983) also 
notes that although details in the organisation of planning changed in the USSR, 
the planners’ priorities had not been altered much. Most of these policy priorities 
can be found in countries that pursued a catching-up industrialisation develop-
ment policy. A more prominent role played by the state in modernisation did not 
limit itself to state-socialist regimes, but to many late industrialisers as well, as 
suggested by Gerschenkron (1962). In such countries, even with fundamentally 
capitalist economies, the government attempted to substitute for the lack of capi-
tal and infrastructure by direct interventions. However, only in socialist countries 
did the state resort to commanding economic agents as regards their target output 
and to distributing the principal part of economic resources.
Even though mathematical methods of optimisation (linear programming, etc.) 
were applied to planning in the 1960–1980s, the plans never became sufficiently 
balanced, what was tacitly recognised even at the very top level. What really 
did change were the growing opportunism of the enterprises’ management and 
their abilities to manipulate plan indicators and planners’ expectations (Gregory 
2003). Therefore, the plans became less ambitious and the ‘balanced’ approach 
dominated over ‘mobilisation’ in terms of Harrison (1985).
Both Gregory (2003), who explored the Soviet archetype, and Kornai (1992), 
who generalised common features of socialist systems, agree on the assertion 
that implicit rules and practices were exported from the Soviet Union to oth-
er planned economies. However, one should bear in mind that other socialist 
countries adopted the Soviet planning system in its rather modest variant. Most 
European satellites of the USSR entered ‘socialism’ at a more advanced stage 
of development and spent much less time under the extremely brutal forms of 
command management than the Soviet economy. Not acting as self-sufficient 
actors in global politics, they also did not have vital needs to assume a too heavy 
defence burden, even though their military spending remained very high relative 
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to their output. Various countries’ specific experience in planning is explored by 
Ellman (1979), Nove (1983) and many other studies. Even before the collapse 
of the USSR, they started to diverge from its central planning model: Yugoslavia 
did so almost from the start of the communist rule, Hungary after 1968, while 
China started reforms at the turn of the 1970s–1980s (followed by Vietnam in the 
late 1980s), gradually drifting to a market-based government management of the 
national economy.
4. THE MODEL
In Section 3 we claimed that while the style and objectives of planning may have 
changed over time, it retained the focus on material production that ultimately 
led to a relative overemphasis of physical capital accumulation relative to other 
factors of production, most notably, human capital. In this section, we use a for-
malised model to capture the main features of this policy. The main results and 
mechanisms can be summarised in a quite succinct way, however, without going 
into technical details. A state-socialist regime, following a Marxism-Leninism-
influenced economic policy, had a tendency to value capital goods (requiring 
relatively more material goods) above consumer goods (requiring a different mix 
of material and immaterial goods). Since material goods are likely to be produced 
in a more physical capital intensive way than immaterial goods, this leads to a 
higher ratio of physical to human capital along the optimal growth path of the 
economy. This has consequences for the performance of the economy as well, but 
the conclusion strongly depends on the way of measurement: in the SNA, since 
the social returns to fixed capital are likely to be lower than that of human capital 
(as is usually found in the empirical literature), the same amount of resources 
spent on increasing physical rather than human capital leads to a lower rate of 
economic growth. It turns out, however, that if one measures performance within 
the MPS, the planned economies produce a faster growth and outperform other 
countries. This necessarily comes at the price of reduced consumption (of both 
tangible and intangible goods). Once a state-socialist regime, probably thanks to 
growing social tensions arising from low consumption, begins to put more em-
phasis on the production of consumer goods relative to capital goods, its physical 
to human capital ratio should necessarily decline. 
The optimisation problem that we discuss below is basically the same as that 
in Caballe – Santos (1993), also covered by Barro – Sala-i-Martin (2004, Chapter 
5). The social planner has a combination of per capita consumption (c) and per 
capita material production (qm) in its utility function, which it seeks to maximise. 
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The value function (V) equals the discounted sum of the utilities over an infinite 
horizon:   
 (1)
where ρ is the discount factor, a and b are parameters that reflect the preferences 
of the planner regarding material production and consumption, which we dis-
cussed in the previous section. The planner’s problem is to maximise the value 
function.
Even though, as argued by Ellman (1973), the socialist government largely 
focuses on material production, we also include consumption in its utility func-
tion since the planner also wishes to prevent hunger or political instability (strong 
empirical evidence for this assumption is provided by Gregory 2003). As such 
we assume that both a and b are positive. Although the declared ultimate goal of 
the central planner was to increase the living standard (that is, consumption) in 
the long run, our model captures not propagandistic but actual economic policy 
priorities realised by the socialist planners, as highlighted in Section 3.
The factor accumulation is governed by the following equations, where, with-
out the loss on generality, we assume the same rate of depreciation in all sectors 
and for both types of capital. The super- and subscripts m and i denote the two 
sectors (material and immaterial), while k and h denote physical and human capi-
tal, with δ and n being the rate of depreciation and the growth rate of labour force, 
respectively. As usual, /x dx dt , I is gross investment during period of dt.
 mm k mk I n kδ    (2)
 ii k ik I n kδ    (3)
 mm h mh I n hδ    (4)
 ii h ih I n hδ    (5)
We assume that the planner seeks to spend all of its income y (resources avail-
able for allocation) at time t, which yields the following budget constraint:
1 1m m i i
t t k h k h m m i iy c I I I I k h k h
β β γ γ        , (6)
where β is the elasticity between physical and human capital in material sectors 
and γ is the same elasticity in immaterial sector.
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Consumption consists of material and immaterial goods, which require a dif-
ferent mix of the two capitals to be produced:
1m
t t tq k h
β β  1it t tq k h  γ γ. (7)
In equation (7) we assume that β > γ, that is, material goods are produced more 
physical capital intensively than immaterial goods.
Consumption is also modelled as a composite of the two types of goods and 
they are assumed to be imperfect substitutes. This is modelled as a Cobb-Douglas 
type function:
   1m it t tc q q  α α  (8)
where α is simply the elasticity between material and immaterial consumption.  
Now we can write the following Hamiltonian8:
  1
2 3 4
ln ln ( ( ) )
( ( ) ) ( ( ) ) ( ( ) )
          
        
t m m i m i i
t t t t t h k h m
i m i
k i h m h i
H e a q b c q q c I I I n k
I n k I n h I n h
ρ λ δ
λ δ λ δ λ δ
 (9)
where H is utility value along the optimal path and λ is the shadow-price.9
The first order conditions for a maximum require: 
1 0
  tc
t
bH e
c
ρ λ , (10)
1 2 1 3 1 40 0 0           i m i
k h hI I I
H H Hλ λ λ λ λ λ , (11)
or
1 2 3 4λ λ λ λ λ    . (12)
8  For econometric application of the Hamiltonian function see Barro – Sala-i-Martin (2004, 
A.3.3 and A.3.5).
9  The shadow price can be understood as the effect of an infinitesimally small change in the 
constraint on the value of the value function. Alternatively, it expresses how much the planner 
would be willing to pay at the optimal path for another unit of a production factor. What we 
find here is that at optimal path, the effect of all factors of production on the value function 
should be equal.
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The additional conditions of an optimal path are:
( ) ( )
m
t m t
t
k
m
e a b q eH n
k
ρ ρβ α λ
λ δ λ
       ), (13)
( (1 ) ) ( )
i
t i t
t
k
i
e b q eH n
k
ρ ργ α λ
λ δ λ
        , (14)
(1 )( ) ( )
m
t m t
t
h
m
e a b q eH n
h
ρ ρβ α λ
λ δ λ
         , (15)
(1 )( (1 ) ) ( )
i
t i t
t
h
i
e b q eH n
h
ρ ργ α λ
λ δ λ
        , (16)
where we already incorporated the condition that the shadow-prices λ1 – λ4 are 
equal along the optimal path. Making above expressions equal for the same sec-
tors leads to the following physical to human capital ratios within each sector:
1
m
m
k
h
β
β
  , (17)
1
i
i
k
h
γ
γ
  .  (18)
The optimal growth rate of consumption is given as follows:
1
( ) ( ) 1( ) ( )
t m t
tt t
m m
c e a b q e a b cn e n
c k k b
βρ ρ
ρβ α λ β α βρ δ ρ δ
λ β
               
 , (19)
1
( (1 ) ) (1 ) 1( ) ( )
t i t
tt t
i i
c e b q e cn e n
c k k
γρ ρ
ργ α λ γ α γρ δ ρ δ
λ γ
               
 , (20)
where we made use of that:
1
1m
t mq k
β
β
β
      
and  
1
1i
t iq k
γ
γ
γ
    
. (21)
Once the steady state is achieved, both per capita income and consumption 
will be constant. This gives us the following consumption level at steady state:
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1
1
( )
t m
t
bkc n e
a b
β
ρβρ δ
β β α
           
, (22)
1
1
(1 )
t i
t
kc n e
γ
ργρ δ
γ γ α
           
. (23)
So the steady state ratio of the physical capital in the two sectors is:
1
1
1
( )
(1 )1
t
m
i t
n e
k a b
k b
n e
γ
ρ
β
ρ
γ
ρ δ
γ β α
γ αβ
ρ δ
β


            
 . (24)
The same for human capital is:
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1
(1 )( )
(1 )(1 )1
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ρ δ
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
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 . (25)
In order to arrive to the economy-wide ratios of physical to human capital, we 
need to express the total amount of physical and human capital in the economy:
1
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ρ δ
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                               
.
  
(26)
Doing the same for human capital yields:
1
1
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γ β α
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
                                 
.
 
(27)
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We can now simply divide the above equations and arrive at the physical to 
human capital ratio:
1
1
1
1
1
( )
1 (1 )(1 )1
1
(1 )( )1
(1 )(1 )1
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t
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t t
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n e
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γ β α
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



                                                
. (28)
This is a general formula when a planner derives utility both from consump-
tion and material production. In the extreme case, when a > 0 and b = 0, that is, 
the planner does not assign any value to consumption, investment will only be in 
the material production and
1
t
t
k
h
β
β
  . (29)
Since usually β < 0.5, this means that k/h < 1.10
In the other extreme case, when a = 0, we have the case where consumption 
is all-important (which will be approximately the case for capitalist/post-socialist 
countries), b cancels out and we get: 
1 1
1 (1 ) 1
t
t
z z
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h z z z
γ γ
β β
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β β
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 (30)
with:
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and if β>γ , z>1. (31)
10  That is, we assume here that the proportion of capital incomes in total income is smaller than 
that of labour incomes.
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We take two additional special cases. If α = β = θ, that is if both material and 
immaterial goods were produced with the same factor intensity, the capital ratio 
at balanced path would be:
( )
1 (1 )(1 )
1
(1 )
t
t
a b
k b
a bh
b
θ θ α
θ θ α
α
α
    
. (32)
If additionally a = 0, that is, the planner’s utility includes only consumption:
1
t
t
k
h
θ
θ
 
, (33)
which is the same result that Barro – Sala-i-Martin (2004, Chapter 5) obtained 
for a market economy. Hence, equation (33) is a special case for the more general 
formula for the k/h ratio in equation (28) along a balanced growth path.
In the following, we choose different values of the parameters in accordance 
with the policy changes and simulate the physical to human capital ratios using 
equation (28). As we found that during the 1920s–1930s, the planner often had 
to give priority to consumption (Gregory 2003), in its utility function we set the 
coefficient values to capture this empirical evidence. We also assume that after 
the 1980s, with the collapse of the planned economy, the utility function of the 
social planner includes much less material production (i.e. a = 1) since after the 
regime change material production is less important while consumption rises in 
importance. During socialist times, however, there was a preference for material 
production. The result is given in Figure 2 below. We have to stress that the above 
model incorporates human capital as direct expenditure into the model, for which 
the closest empirical equivalent is the cost-based measure (see Judson 2002 or 
Van Leeuwen – Földvári 2008). The income-based measures reflect private and 
social returns to human capital, so even though its trends should not deviate from 
the cost-based measurement for a very long period, it is much less appropriate for 
testing the model.
5. EFFECTS ON ECONOMIC GROWTH
The above simulations show that once we take the differences in the objectives of 
the socialist planner relative to the market economy into account, the increased 
focus on physical capital accumulation can be placed within the framework of ra-
tional decision. But how does this policy affect economic growth from the view-
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point of the socialist planner? The empirical success of the strategy depends on 
how we measure economic growth: since the non-material sources of value added 
are excluded from the NMP, socialist countries are more likely to appear success-
ful if we measure their economic activity in terms of NMP rather than in GDP.
In principle, the accumulation of any type of capital should lead to a temporary 
increase in economic growth, but due to their decreasing marginal product, this 
cannot be sustained unless the other type of capital also increases. Just like in the 
original model by Caballé – Santos (1993), the optimal k/h ratio should remain 
constant along the balanced growth path unless the model parameters change fun-
damentally, but deviations are also possible (imbalanced growth), which should 
increase the growth rate relative to the balanced growth rate.11 According to our 
model, when aggregate economic activities are measured in terms of NMP, an 
increase in the k/h ratio should have a greater impact on output than when GDP 
is used. 
In order to find an empirical confirmation for this, we use the data for the 
USSR, for which we have a good coverage of NMP data and also cost-based hu-
man capital estimates, which are more comparable with physical capital than in-
11  If the economy has the tendency to return to the balanced growth path, this growth bonus is 
only temporary.
Figure 2. Simulated and actual physical to human capital ratio in the ex-USSR
Notes: Assumptions: ρ = 0.02; δ = 0.07; n = 0.01;
1920–1940: a = 1; b = 3; α = 0.6; β = 0.3; γ = 0.2;
1950s: a = 2; b = 1; α = 0.6; β = 0.4, γ = 0.2; 
1960s: a = 3; b = 1; α = 0.6; β = 0.4, γ = 0.2; 
1970s and 1980s: a = 2; b = 1; α = 0.6; β = 0.4, γ = 0.2; 
1990s and 2000s: a = 0; b = 2; α = 0.5; β = 0.3, γ = 0.2.
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come-based measures, and hence are more in line with the human capital concept 
applied in the theoretical model. We choose 1955–1989 as our sample period, 
which can be seen as a relatively stable period of the Soviet planned economy, 
after the forced industrialisation of Stalin, but before the transition to a market 
economy. The initial unit root tests suggest that all of our variables are stationary 
(Table 2).
Table 2
Unit-root tests, USSR 1955–1989 (p-values in parentheses)
ADF 
(lag selection with MAIC)
Phillips-Perron
log of per capita GDP –2.628 (0.097) –3.636 (0.0099)
log of per capita NMP –5.751 (0.000) –7.267 (0.000)
log of k/h –6.278 (0.000) –5.779 (0.000)
Using these data, we estimate two vector autoregressive (VAR) systems, one 
with per capita GDP and the other with per capita NMP. All lag-length selection 
criteria suggest a VAR(1) system, but the exclusion tests suggest that a second lag 
still has significant explanatory power. For this reason, we estimated VAR(2) sys-
tems for both specifications. In both cases, the residuals are normally distributed 
and have no serial correlation significant at 5%. Also, all the characteristic roots 
are found to be within the unit circle, hence the impulse-response functions (IRF) 
are meaningful (Figure 3). 
Figure 3 reflects the reaction of the endogenous variables of the system on 
an innovation of one standard deviation magnitude. An initial increase in the k/h 
ratio has an immediate negative impact on both the per capita GDP and NMP, but 
after 4 (NMP) or 6 (GDP) years a positive impact appears. The total effect can be 
Figure 3. Impulse response functions
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estimated by looking at the accumulated responses: after 20 years a permanent 
one standard deviation increase in the log(k/h) (0.26, i.e. about 26% increase in 
k/h) had an impact of 1.17% on the NMP per capita, while only 0.3% on GDP 
per capita. We can hence conclude that the economic policy aiming at a higher 
physical to human capital ratio in the USSR proved to be more efficient within 
the MPS than from an SNA-based point of view.
At the early stage of industrialisation (1920s–1930s), growth rates of NMP 
outperformed those of GNP in the USSR. They grew almost at the same rate in 
the 1950s, while in the 1960s–1980s growth measured by GDP was a little bit 
faster than by NMP. However, both rates were declining significantly. Moreover, 
the Soviet immaterial sector remained subdued, indicating the divergence with 
more advanced market economies. Clearly, GDP/GNP growth rates outperformed 
those of NMP at an advanced stage of industrial development and during the tran-
sition to post-industrial society when human capital intensive sectors were on the 
rise. In earlier stages of economic development, dominated by physical capital 
intensive sectors, NMP growth outperformed GDP/GNP growth. Hence, after an 
initial head start for NMP, GDP growth had taken the lead by the end of the cen-
tury. One could expect the gap between GDP and NMP growth measures at the 
end of the 20th century to be wider in state-socialist countries, had their social 
planners and economic policy makers had more preference towards consumption 
and a lower physical to human capital ratio. The dynamics of both these measures 
during the start of transition to market economy revealed that NMP was more 
sensitive to adverse transformation shocks, while GDP was somewhat supported 
by the service sector.
6. CONCLUSION
There are two important observations concerning the aggregate economic per-
formance of centrally planned economies. On the one hand, they initially expe-
rienced fast economic development due to strong capital accumulation, while, 
on the other hand, their growth rates declined due to a rising physical to human 
capital ratio (k/h).
In this paper, we address these two facts in the framework of a theoretical 
model which allows for differences in the objective function of the social plan-
ner. State-socialist governments had preferences including both consumption and 
material production, while in market economies, where a central planner does not 
even exist, it is only consumption that can affect utility. With socialist govern-
ments having a preference for material production (Ellman 1973), due to their 
different understanding of value, our model predicts that state-socialist countries 
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must have had a higher physical to human capital ratio (k/h ratio) along the opti-
mal growth path. This is confirmed by our empirical observations: using a VAR 
analysis on the USSR data, we find that while a permanent increase in the k/h 
ratio did result in a very small, economically non-significant increase in terms of 
GDP per capita, once we measure value added in terms of net material product, 
the estimated effect increases by a factor of almost four. 
Only when human capital intensive (and physical capital extensive) sectors 
were on the rise in the late 20th century, did an increase in the physical/human 
capital ratio become negative and insignificant. The fact that this applies both to 
capitalist and (former) socialist countries implies that even though the choices 
made by centrally planned economies at the start and the middle of the 20th cen-
tury were both theoretically and empirically logical for the socialist planner at the 
time, they eventually led to a reduction in economic growth.
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